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Puritans, Visionaries and Survivors
Stewart R. Clegg
Abstract
All readings take place in the here-and-now, even of texts written back there and then.
Nowhere in management and organization theory has this been truer of anyone than
Max Weber. Unread in English during his lifetime, it was nearly 30 years after his
death before his ideas had much impact. When they did, they were read in a context
and tradition years away from those in which they were conceived. And, ever since,
they have been subject to systematic reinterpretation on the one hand and neglect 
on the other. The paper addresses how one might use Weber today, in terms of 
his sensitivity to current issues, such as sustainability, as well as the still largely
unacknowledged foundation that Weber constructed for contemporary cultural
studies. The paper will bring these two themes together, using analysis of contem-
porary equivalents to the popular culture that formed the basis for some of Weber’s
own investigations.
Keywords: Weber, culture, bureaucracy, rationality, puritans, visions, survivors,
sustainability, McDonald’s
To encounter Weber as a management or organizations student today is, by
and large, to experience a representation that situates him, if at all, within the
narrative of formal management theories (Robbins and De Cenzo 2005).
However, as these were first initiated in the late 19th century, in a great wave
of mobilization around the notion of engineering, they barely occupied the
same conceptual universe as Weber, a founding father of social science. These
pioneers of management argued that engineering, if applied appropriately,
would not only legitimate the manager as a new class of highly skilled
employee but would also justify the entire structures of control in which they
were inserted. It would make these structures authoritative — for what could
be a better basis for authority in the new world than the legitimacy of science
(Shenhav 1999)?
Engineering rationality replaced older legitimation grounded in the
Protestant ethic (Weber 1976) or ideas about the survival of the fittest,
flourishing as Social Darwinism (Therborn 1976). Emerging out of the
institutional sponsorship of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers,
scientific management was able to position itself as a rational and irrefutable
bastion against the privileges that ownership allowed. Installing scientific
management, it was claimed, would eradicate arbitrary and socially
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destructive domination, tame it and make it authority: it would create a
legitimate model of hierarchy and management conceived not just as the
expression of a dilettante or capricious will. It was based, its protagonists
said, on facts and technical analysis of the organizational situation. It was
grounded in functional analysis of necessity rather than the arbitrary exercise
of will by an overseer or master. It would fit the person to the job, after the
job had first been scientifically analysed. Thus, people were to be slotted into
their positions on the basis of their aptitudes and abilities, formed through
whatever circumstances. Above all, management would be the harbinger and
hallmark of efficiency. It was into this brave new world of formally efficient
administration that Weber was inscribed as a part of the classical canon by
management writers (Pugh 1971).
Weber was never a conscious part of the classical management canon in
any contemporaries’ calculations, least of all his own. While he wrestled with
questions of rationality and came up with an analysis that far exceeded the
insights of early 20th-century management scholars, as he had published them
only in German, few English writers knew of his work. He was not much read
by Anglophone management theorists until after the Second World War,
when his works were widely translated into English (Weber 1930, 1946, 1947,
1949, 1954, 1962, 1965, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1978). Weber (1978) was familiar
with the work of Taylor and other scientific management writers but they
were not familiar with him. Weber did not use the term ‘efficiency’, preferring
instead to write about ‘technical rationality’. Today, efficiency is not only
taken for granted as a pre-eminent value but is also bundled up with other
cultural values such as the pursuit of ‘innovation’ or ‘profit’. Such a focus is
limited: as has been argued elsewhere (Clegg 1995a), Weber was rather less
a classical management theorist and rather more a student of culture,
practising what today we would call ‘cultural studies’. He was a student of
‘contemporary culture’, concentrating on subjectivity, in the relation of
culture to individual lives, which did not, of course, dissuade him from
analysis of its historical genealogy: moreover; he was an ‘engaged scholar’
(During 1993: 1–2); for Weber, certain scholarly, liberal and national values
were pre-eminent (see Weber’s (1946) two essays on ‘vocation’).
Considered through the focus on organization analysis as an aspect of
cultural studies, what are we to make of Weber today?
I will suggest that Weber’s conception of rationality still needs to be read
in terms of the central liberal values that framed his ideas on rational legal
bureaucracy. Second, I will discuss those sources of substantive irrationality
that Weber identified within the conditions within which formal rationality
existed. Third, the value basis of conceptions of rationality needs to be
discussed with reference not only to Weber’s times but also to ours, when, at
the apex of organizations, the strategic search is for visions with which to re-
enchant the mundane world. For many organizations, however, such visions
can only ever ring hollow: a mundane lack of visionary purpose is only too
evident in ruthlessly exploitative organizations (March 2002). In such a
McDonaldized world, suggest contemporary Weberians (Ritzer 2004a), there
is little to do but go shopping in pursuit of nothing. Just as Weber found the
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clue to his contemporary culture in the popular culture texts of his day, such
as those of Benjamin Franklin, the present paper will suggest that there are
contemporary popular cultural texts at work today whose elective affinities
suit the new times. These are situated within the genre of those ‘reality’
television programmes which seek to re-enchant identity through strategies
for the presentation and management of self. 
How Do Cultural Values Become Legitimated?
There is a wonderful exchange, from the film Monty Python and the Holy
Grail, about the nature of legitimacy, when King Arthur is asked:
Woman: Well, how did you become King, then?
Arthur: The Lady of the Lake ...
Angels sing.
... her arm clad in the purest shimmering samite, held aloft Excalibur from
the bosom of the water signifying by Divine Providence that I, Arthur, was
to carry Excalibur.
Singing stops.
That is why I am your king!
Dennis: Listen. Strange women lying in ponds distributing swords is no basis for a
system of government. Supreme executive power derives from a mandate
from the masses, not from some farcical aquatic ceremony.
Arthur: Be quiet!
Dennis: Well, but you can’t expect to wield supreme executive power just ’cause
some watery tart threw a sword at you!
Arthur: Shut up!
Dennis: I mean, if I went round saying I was an emperor just because some
moistened bint had lobbed a scimitar at me, they’d put me away!
(written by Graham Chapman and John Cleese, from the film Monty Python and
the Holy Grail, directed by Terry Gilliam and Terry Jones in 1975)
In different epochs, distinct, more or less abstract, cultural values can be
used to construct, model and replicate particular rationalities. That is the point
of the Monty Python sketch: the will of the people, a liberal conception, would
be meaningless in the society represented in the film. Peasants shovelling filth
in the Dark Ages could know nothing of such things, let alone their extension
in socialist discourse to the mandate of the masses — the rationalities had yet
to emerge historically. Hence, for those aware of history, as well as liberal
and socialist discourse, the joke is one to be savoured with even greater
appreciation. (The Python team clearly learned something about politics while
at Oxford University.)
The mandate of the people or Divine Providence both make reference to
something outside the nature of executive authority to warrant legitimacy
whereas bureaucracy, as executive authority, does not — it refers only to its
own practice, according to rule; thus, at the core of Weber’s (1978) conception
of organization as a professional bureaucracy was the notion that members
of such an organization would adhere to the vocation as well as the rules of
that organization. Whereas earlier forms of rule, such as those based on
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primogeniture or Divine Providence, could refer to something outside of itself
as the basis of its rationality, rational bureaucracy was wholly reflexive: it
referred to nothing other than its purpose and process as the source of its
legitimacy; hence, it is by its claims to rationality that it will be judged.
Rational-legal authority signifies that deference and obedience are owed not
to the person or the title they hold but to the role they fill. It is not the officer
but the office that is owed homage because it is a part of a rational and
recognized disposition of relationships in a structure of offices. People obey
orders rationally because they believe that the person giving the order is acting
in accordance with a code of legal rules and regulations (Albrow 1970: 43).
Moreover, they regard it as their vocation to do so for it is through such a
form of life that their work finds meaning.
Identity Neutrality and Rationality
One of the ways in which bureaucracy generates its own legitimacy is through
the limits it places on arbitrary power and privilege and the right of appeal
that it provides, where one can construct a case that the limits of arbitrary
power have been voided according to the law that is supposed and presumed
to govern. Ideally, none are above the law, none can escape rules and every
office will be accountable. In short, bureaucracy should and would be a
bulwark of civil liberty. Thus, a cornerstone of liberal bureaucracy for Weber
was that it would operate ‘without regard for persons’. It wouldn’t matter 
if you were black or white, Muslim or Jew, gay or straight, rich or poor. 
It shouldn’t matter who or what you are. You would be entitled to be judged
not on the prejudices of the community or the person applying a rule but
strictly according to the rules, without regard for the specificities of whatever
might be your identity. Counterfactual cases, such as applied in South Africa
when the Apartheid regime’s notorious ‘Pass Laws’ existed in the era prior
to President Mandela assuming the Presidency of the new Republic, make
the liberal case evident. The law differentiated its treatment of people in terms
of their identity as administratively defined categories of ‘White’, ‘Black’
and ‘Coloured’. While this may have been a rational bureaucracy, it could
never be a liberal one any more than could the White Australia Policy or the
denial of civil rights to black people in the United States, from the same era.
Even in what might appear to be a liberal bureaucracy, being subject to
abstract, impersonal rules might be menacing rather than comforting. It was
not only novelists such as Kafka (1956) who voiced reservations about
bureaucracy. Weber, too, had his doubts about this new instrument. Because
of its ‘purely technical superiority’ bureaucracy seemed almost irresistible,
Weber (1976) thought, and this irresistibility alarmed him. Rational calcula-
tion had become a monstrous discipline. Everything seemingly had to be put
through a calculus, irrespective of other values or pleasures. It was a necessary
and unavoidable feature of organizing in the modern world. While Weber
greatly admired the achievements of bureaucracy he was also pessimistic about
their long-term impact. On the one hand, bureaucracies would free people from
arbitrary rule by powerful patrimonial leaders: those who personally owned
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the instruments and offices of rule. They would do this because they were
based on rational legality — the rule of law contained in the files that defined
practice in the bureau. On the other hand, they would create an ‘iron cage of
bondage’ (or more literally, as translated from the original German, a house
of hardened steel). The frame was fashioned from the ‘care for external goods’
(Weber 1976: 181), which meant, if these goods were to come into one’s grasp
in a market economy, mortgaging one’s life to a hierarchy of offices that
interlocked and intermeshed, through whose intricacies one might seek to
move, with the best hope for one’s future being that one would shift from being
a small cog in the machine to one that was slightly bigger, in a slow but steady
progression. However, the iron cage could rust.
Rust Never Sleeps1
The second chapter of Max Weber’s (1978) Economy and society deals with
the relationship between formal and substantive rationality (see the excellent
account of the different conceptions of rationality in Kalberg 1980). For
Weber, economic action based on the best technically possible practice of
quantitative calculation or accounting would be the most formally rational:
it would display the form of rationality. By contrast, substantive rationality
would denote a concept of goal-oriented action where whatever the goals
might be would vary according to the context within which they work: hence,
they would be indivisible from the real substance of specific settings.
Economic action may be substantively rational to the extent that it is moti-
vated and assessed according to an ultimate goal, even while it is technically
irrational. Family businesses often fit this case. Family firms know what it
would be technically rational to do, such as raising capital by diluting family
equity, but the preservation of the family holdings, even if it means less
efficiency, growth and profits, is held in higher esteem. Such a substantive
orientation, Weber notes from the start, may lead the actor to see formal,
quantitative calculation as less important, or even inimical to the achievement
of ultimate ends. Put simply, people will not necessarily be instrumentally
rational managers, applying means–end rationality to the calculation of an
economic bottom line, unless either they are in structured situations in which
they have no choice other than to achieve this end, or they really want to
achieve this end. Where their preferences are for other ends, such as the
maintenance of tradition, or the family business under family control, or 
the design and creation of something that they love dearly, even when it is
economically irrational in instrumental terms to do so, they orient themselves
to other forms of rationality, such as affective or traditional conceptions of
rationality. Think of a successful entrepreneur who invests a fortune in a
football club with which they have a sentimental affinity, even when the team
remains a motley collection of expensive losers.
The more the world approximates to a formally rationalized ideal of
capitalist accounting in which ultimate ends hardly figure, the more chance
that rationality will be wholly instrumental, says Weber (1978: 165). In such
a situation a specific cultural value — efficiency, defined in terms of the
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categories of a particular form of knowledge — is raised to the status of an
‘ultimate value’ culturally prized as an end in itself. The organizations that
exist under these conditions do so because, in all probability, ‘certain persons
will act in such a way as to carry out the order governing the organization’
(Weber 1978: 49). In other words organization is premised on an expectation
of trust in the obedience of others. Trust and obedience function as resources
in creating effectively functioning organization (as some central contributions
by Fox 1974, Granovetter 2002, Gambetta 1988, Kramer 2003 and Sievers
2003 argue).
Weber (1978: 108) isolates three circumstances where ‘irrationality’ can
arise from the instrumental rationality of capital accounting as the perfect
expression of means–end relations. First, where there are autonomous and
antagonistic enterprises, producing only according to the criterion of arbitrarily
distributed demand. Second, where capital accounting occurs in circumstances
that presuppose absolute property rights over capital goods and where manage-
ment has a purely commercial orientation, then speculative behaviour will be
favoured. Such capital accounting is technically most optimal under ideal
economic-liberal conditions, where there are unfettered proprietorial preroga-
tives and absolute market freedom. The conditions supporting this include free
labour markets; complete freedom of contract; rational technology; a formally
rational administration and legal system, and a complete divorce between
enterprise and household organization. Rationality according to the capital
accounting formula produces a free market and the most efficient location of
capital among competing activities, but it will hardly be conducive, Weber
thinks, to the cultivation of rational employees. Rational employees would
show no necessary commitment to any particular allocation of capital that
presently employed them but would treat the labour market just as rationally
as an accountant in search of the best return. Just as a rational capitalist might
seek to corner the market in a specific commodity, so might a rational employee
through the mechanism of collective organization and bargaining.
The third circumstance in which Weber sees formal rationality being
compromised is where economic organization becomes prey to competing
and contradictory calculations. Such a situation can occur when share
ownership becomes the subject of a takeover battle between competing
interests. Where control is concentrated in proprietorial interests, credit and
financial institutions, predators can acquire the issued share capital for
speculative purposes. Either way, the outside interests pursue their own
business interest, ‘Often foreign to those of the organization as such’ and ‘not
primarily oriented to the long-term profitability of the enterprise’ (Weber
1978: 139; see also the discussion in Clegg et al. 1986: 61–62). The impli-
cations become acute when such interests ‘consider their control over the
plant and capital goods of the enterprise ... not as a permanent investment,
but as a means of making a purely short-run speculative profit’ (Weber 1978:
140). Weber recognized that rationality would not always be purely
instrumental: people rationalized their own versions of rationality based upon
contextual pressures and interests. Sometimes these would reward short-term
rather than long-term rationality.
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Values-Based Rationality and Organizations
Weber foresaw that ultimate values would be in inexorable decline as
modernity, defined in terms of an increasing rationalization of the world
through new institutions and a concomitant decline in beliefs in enchantment,
magic and fatalism, developed. In large part this would be because the
‘calculability’ contained in the disciplinary rationality that the Puritans
embraced — such as double-entry bookkeeping — would progressively
replace values with technique. As techniques increasingly achieved what
previously only great value commitments could ensure, then the necessity for
these values would diminish. The future would be one in which we strive to
work ceaselessly in jobs and organizations that neither served ultimate values
nor adequately filled the space left by the values they purported to replace.
The outcome of this process of rationalization, Weber suggests, is the
production of a new type of person: the specialist or technical expert. Such
experts master reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts.
Statistics, for example, began in the 19th century as a form of expert codified
knowledge of everyday life and death, which could inform public policy. The
statistician became a paradigm of the new kind of expert, dealing with every-
day things but in a way that was far removed from everyday understandings.
Weber sometimes referred to the results of this process as disenchantment,
meaning the process whereby all forms of magical, mystical, traditional
explanation is stripped away from the world. The world stripped bare by
rational analysis is always open and amenable to the calculations of technical
reason. It holds no mystery. New disciplines colonize it (Clegg 1995b). Weber
argued that identities would be increasingly subject to specialization and
routinization processes in bureaucracies.
Today, at the beginning of the 21st century, considerably more space for
identity creation and less space for specialized and routinized formation seems
to be in order, and the arena for identity construction has shifted perceptibly
from relations of production to those of consumption. That change should
occur is not surprising: rationalities are historically structured differently in
varying periods, as different kinds of knowledge dominate. (We saw this with
the earlier Python example.) As the rules of the game shift historically, then
different issues become critical for organization strategy. As these issues shift,
different forms of occupational knowledge give personnel an advantage in
terms of the shifting rules of the game. Rationality concerns not just technical
efficiency because it is always culturally and politically framed. As Dyck
(1997) demonstrates, transformational changes are more likely to be imple-
mented if supported primarily by value-based rationality. But the values-
based rationality of yesterday does not necessarily cut the mustard today.
Re-enchanting Values-Based Rationality
Today, the notion of a calling no longer prowls around in our lives, like a
ghost in the night. Stripped bare of belief, I will propose as a hypothesis that
the cultural meanings attached to work have, once again, become what
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Spencer (1904) always thought they were, for those who play the game: the
survival of the fittest. In terms of contemporary popular culture everyday
conceptions of rationality are best seen as represented in TV shows (the
equivalent, in circulatory and social impact terms, of the 19th-century
homilies of Franklin or Smiles). One index is the hugely successful comedy
series, The Office. Here ‘fun’ becomes the basis for organizationally situated
actions and vocabularies of motive (Mills 2002) with which some, at least,
of the characters, form publicly available rationalities through which they
seek to justify their organizational action. The characters act out their
aggressions and hostilities, as well as their attractions, to each other, through
the contestation of this rationality and its constant undercutting through an
artful use of silence such as John Cage (1961) or Thelonius Monk (1955), as
well as of reflective glances, that another musician, Alfred Schutz (1976),
might have appreciated. Silence and glances punctuate and puncture
pretensions that have to be tolerated. Structures of authority and resistance to
them are never far from the surface, even of fun. Indeed, the fun renders
authority less amenable to discussion and, as such, works to reinforce social
hierarchy in organizations. Enjoying business is a common ideology of highly
competitive teams, often expressed in terms of sporting team metaphors.
The expertise of sport produces hyper-competitive and hyper-
individualistic identities, even in a team context. It produces brands, such as
Beckham. Today, in an age of mass media, a contemporary Weberian seeking
to gauge the spirit of the age would not confine attention to the homilies of a
Samuel Smiles or a Benjamin Franklin: not only would they watch The Office
and The Footy Show, they would also read the tabloid newspapers and watch
the tabloid television to tap into the geist. However, it is not only on the sports
field that one can be a competitor. In everyday life, as represented in popular
culture, anyone, in principle, can be a competitor. Competitive edge is judged
democratically by the use of digital technology, especially mobile and virtual
technologies, as competitors are ritualistically voted out of the game. The
winner takes all; everyone has the democratic potential to be a winner,
although it helps to be the token gay, blonde, or metrosexual, because you fit
the identity scripts that the focus groups tell the producers are required for a
seriously stereotyped competition. Such identity is a matter of demographics
rather than of unique individuality (as per Foucault’s (1997) notion of bio-
politics). The point of winning is to provide an entertaining spectacle that
provides the informed viewer with voyeuristic pleasure (Big Brother,
Survivor, The Apprentice). The democratic values of the genre are easily
situated within a frame of elitist expertise, where humiliation is the measure
of the currency in which most experts deal as they flout their knowledge in
order to construct a superior subjectivity in otherness to the everyday person.
In some of the shows, such as Other People’s Houses, Selling Houses, What
Not to Wear, Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, the everyday person is seen as
someone whose identity is questionable: they are not effective managers of
the presentation of their selves and lives to the world. (We are dealing with
something existentially real here rather than a failure to be familiar with
Goffman [1959].) They cannot decorate their houses properly, so it is hardly
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surprising if they cannot sell them; they do not know what aspects of identity
to accentuate and what to mute, and, if they are women, they have not
developed a canonical knowledge of what is absolutely fabulous and what is
not, and if they are straight men they cannot differentiate brown from taupe,
do not know how to groom, and so are deemed clearly clueless, useless and
hopeless. Only expertise can save them — as it can save you — to go out and
compete at life and work more successfully. Once there in work, as in life,
it’s a Survivor syndrome: survive this assessment, that promotion, make the
right presentation and you may thrive to survive — but you’re only ever as
good as your last presentation — of self, that is. Not quite what Spencer had
in mind, perhaps, but a long way from any notion of vocation (other than that
of shopping, perhaps: of which more subsequently).
Such theatre sees the presentation of self in everyday life as the key
responsibility of the self in question (Goffman 1959). Now if this were only
a mater of entertainment then it would hardly have organizational implica-
tions. But it is far more pervasive. Contemporary organizational subjects, as
others manage them, must learn to see themselves as effective managers of
their self as they are subject to 360-degree feedback, to coaching, and related
techniques of self-management and self-surveillance. Existentially free, they
cling to whatever team, community, or clan they can aspire to, join, or become.
With the churches largely empty, and communities fragmented, in the West
organizations emerge as a viable (if not unreliable) source of community.
From this point of view, we are all accountable for our destiny — not before
God but the objective mechanisms of the organizations that hold our fate 
in their contractual hands and reflexively constitute their rules of practice in
doing so, just as we reflexively constitute our designer selves to negotiate a
fit between imagined community and organizational images: it is, once again,
time for Goffman (1959).
The Dialectics of Organization Enchantment
Where Weber saw an increasing rationalization of the world with the
separation of bureaucratic means from whatever political ends drove their
purpose, modern writers instead point to an increasing enchantment. Ardent
bureaucratic reformers, such as Peters (1992), Osborne and Gaebler (1992)
and Kanter (1990), urge leaders of bureaucracies to develop new relations 
of meaning and purpose, framed by the ‘vision’ conceived by their chief
executive(s), or their consultants. Chief executives and consultants have come
to be defined as the charismatic visionaries of a secular age. Visionaries were
not always so divorced from religious connotations. We should, perhaps, not
forget the religious, pre-modern derivation of vision and visionaries: in feudal
times — against which the economic conditions of a rational legal conception
emerged — one was as likely to be condemned as lauded for having visions
(Roper 1994). Visions were generally dramatic and unsettling challenges 
to the keepers of knowledge, the priesthood. While they might excite the
populace they were as likely to enflame them and hence were best avoided
in favour of the reiteration of organizational orthodoxy. Visions are no longer
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enchanted religious convictions; rather, they retain their enchantment only in
as much they have made themselves in the image of people for whom the
market is their icon (Schreurs 2000).
Modern managerial capitalism has solved the unsettling effects of visions
by making them the preserve of the powerful rather than the powerless, of
CEOs rather than peasant girls such as Joan of Arc. The vision becomes a
tool of prescribed action rather than emancipatory change. The less bureau-
cratically powerful are urged to attend to futures imagined for them by the
more powerful — rather than the vision being an articulation of an aesthetic
made pure by its supposed distance from power, as enlightened knowledge.
Indeed, as one might expect, in a rationalized age, visions can no longer be
left to authentic individual insight but are designed, created and crafted by
vision consultants able to make a business statement capable of turning core
purposes and values to visionary goals, in what clients no doubt accept as a
reasonable facsimile of a thing of extraordinary beauty, authenticity and
uniqueness. 
In the public sector the effects of visionaries upon employees’ work 
are reasonably well known. Since the set of policy initiatives that analysts
loosely termed Thatcherism (Gamble 1988) emerged in the early 1980s, the
preferred route for changing the public sector entailed replacing the dedicated
career bureaucrat at its apex with political appointees who would ensure 
that technical virtuosity did not undermine their attachment to political vision.
Such appointments appear to require the adoption of a new subjectivity by
public servants: they are the key mechanism whereby classical liberal
bureaucracy transforms into contemporary market-efficient bureaucracy (see,
for example, Cálas and Smircich 1999; Mol 1999; Callon 1998, 1999) even
as old ways of doing things stick and settle down, deeply sedimented, in both
consciousness and organization, irretrievably there, prowling about like a
ghost, as Weber (1976) might have said.
In general, albeit that they are taken as the source of entrepreneurial
enchantment, March (2002) is less sanguine about private sector visionaries
setting a radical change agenda than are the advocates of the new public sector
management. March stresses that adaptiveness involves both the exploitation
of what is known as well as the exploration of what is not yet known 
and might come to be so. Exploitation is aided by strongly legitimated and
uncontested organization cultures where people know and perform in highly
institutionalized, appropriate ways. By contrast, exploration thrives on
accident, randomness, chance, and risk-taking. It requires more relaxed
attitudes to controls and institutional norms. Risky behaviour is more likely
to occur when organizations are failing to meet targets than when they are
achieving them, when they are failing rather than succeeding. However, risks
are best taken when there are sufficient slack or surplus resources that the
organization can afford to risk different ways of doing things. In many
respects, however, it is least likely that risks will be taken at this time because
the grooves of success are already directing the organization.
March suggests that those organizations that become specialist at short-
run efficiency in exploitation will fail in the long run, because of their inability
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to explore. Where a rigid organization fails to explore sufficiently, another
will replace it by successfully mutating through exploiting what the previous
one failed to explore. He foresees a future of short-term organizations that
are effectively disposable. These organizations will efficiently exploit what
they know how to do until some other organizations emerge to do this better.
Then they will die. Adaptability will occur at the population rather than
necessarily at the specific organizational level. Overall, efficiency will be
served while specific organizations may not survive. Not every organization
can be a survivor. For March’s scenario to be realized, however, there has to
be a pool of organizations that are discontinuously exploring learning through
active imagining. Of course, without the pioneering of new forms and struc-
tures there would be no new and more efficient mutations of organization
forms to succeed those that already exist. Now, if March is right, what this
probably means is a double-edged movement: what is foreseen is a type of
Blade Runner scenario with highly innovative science-based knowledge
organizations situated in gleaming towers and pristine parks for the highly
paid, skilled and educated on the one hand, while for the rest there are
exploitive and relatively impoverished street-level organizations, providing
a poor working environment. No wonder that the Survivor syndrome should
be so widespread.
Weber, of course, was famously disenchanted with those creations he sur-
veyed, a tendency that persists in contemporary Weberian work. The American
sociologist George Ritzer (2004c) coined the term ‘McDonaldization’. It refers
to the application of technical rationality to all areas of human life. It is, as
Ritzer acknowledges, a contemporary variant on the Weberian theme of the
rationalization of the world. The model of the McDonald’s fast-food restaurant
is a metaphor for a highly rationalized and ‘cheap as chips’ approach to
business processes ‘by which the principles of the fast-food restaurants are
coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the
rest of the world’ (Ritzer, 2004c: 1). However, McDonaldization does not stop
at the fast-food store — it spreads to all areas of everyday life, to recreation,
informal and interpersonal relationships and even love and intimacy — think
of ‘speed dating’.
McDonaldization may be seen as a soulless prefiguring of the kind of Hell
— the endless repetition of being in the frying pan of life as if one were
already in the fire of purgatory — that is usually served from the pulpit (an
image borrowed from James Joyce’s [1977] A portrait of the artist as a young
man). However, as it mostly employs young people, part time, who are
students, many put up with it because they know that it is not a life sentence.
Not everyone working in a McDonaldized organization is so fortunate. For
some people the segmentation of the labour market condemns them to a
lifetime of junk jobs, punctuated by the odd ‘escape attempt’ (Cohen and
Taylor 1976) into ‘cathedrals of consumption’ (Ritzer 2004b), to enjoy the
spectacles mounted there. But even enchantment can be routinized and made
mundane, can be made into nothing rather than something.
If most working lives are soulless, so are the lives of consumption they
sustain: increasingly we consume nothing — at least according to Ritzer’s
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(2004a) latest work. ‘Nothing’ refers to ‘a social form that is generally centrally
conceived, controlled, and comparatively devoid of distinctive or substantive
content’ (2004a: 3; italics in original). Nothing should be contrasted with
something. Something is a ‘social form that is generally indigenously
conceived, controlled and comparatively rich in distinctive substantive content;
a form which is to a large degree substantively unique’ (Ritzer 2004a: 7; italics
in original). As he is at pains to express, his definition is not judgemental but
merely descriptive. (His initial exemplar of nothing is the credit card.)
Phenomena that fall towards the nothing end of the continua are largely
devoid of individuality and specificity, while those that fall towards the
something end are highly specific in terms of place, thinghood, persons and
service; by contrast, phenomena that tend towards nothing are offered
anywhere, for anything (non-things), by anyone (non-persons), and in such
a way that they largely displace service elements on to the customer (non-
services). Ritzer’s argument is that that which is increasingly being marketed
and consumed, which is fuelling globalization, is the proliferation of generic 
and interchangeable goods and services that lack any specificity and embed-
dedness in place, and are relatively time-less (lacking in temporal specificity),
dehumanized and disenchanted.
With Ritzer, Weber’s world-weary worker steps out of the office to dwell
in an existential house of consumption, where most of what is consumed is
nothingness, in an endless round of shopping (which is invariably reported
as the number one leisure activity in the UK). Ritzer paints this bleak terrain
as essentially modern but there are pre-modern precursors, as Weber was well
aware. In many ways, the prototype of such nothing would be traditional
Catholicism, where the catechism was in Latin, a language of which, on the
whole, the peasants and proletarians who partook of it, knew nothing. Run
from Rome, tightly controlled by Papal edicts, and substantively meaningless
in its particulars, other than as a form of ritual consumption, Catholicism was
the perfect prefiguring of the forms of nothing that Ritzer (2004a) sees as so
pervasive today, albeit that the content of Catholicism was full of enchanted
things: angels, devils, hell, seraphim, cherubim and so on. The thesis about
the rationalization of the world and its disenchantment began with the
Protestant ethic, which personalized the form of worship as it rationalized 
the content. Today, the vast majority enjoy re-enchanted forms of secular
presentations of self at work and in play that the world was supposed to be
rid of as a result of Protestantism (Trinca and Fox 2004), even while, in some
countries, evangelical and fundamental forms increasingly seek to mobilize
public spaces. By this analysis, shopping rivals religion as the central life
interest — or great opiate of the people. ‘I work to shop, therefore I am what
I can become’ positions a new duality at the core of contemporary existence,
rubbing up against more fundamentalist creeds.
In the course of 100 years Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy and its core
construct of rationality has been colonized, maligned and misrepresented by
some of the best-known names in organization theory. While bureaucracy
represented the best that the organizational world had to offer at the time that
he wrote, it no longer finds much resonance as an inspiration in contemporary
538 Organization Studies 26(4)
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on May 25, 2011oss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
organization theory. For one thing, the emphasis has switched from a world
of disciplined producers to one of disciplined consumers, as Ritzer charts.
For another, the new conceptions of managerial work, even in the public
sector, are more centred on the creativity of vision than the discipline of rules.
While senior bureaucrats were interchangeable identities, at their best, today
senior organizational managers strive to be a unique identity: he or she is an
expert in a world shaped by competition rather more than conformance, who
dispenses normative judgements about identity rather more than treatment
according to the rules, irrespective of the person. Surviving the various
projects of a self-managed and individual career takes precedence over
serving the organization.
In research terms, the questions that Weber asked were of his time, not
ours, and there is little point in labouring over them again today. Things have
changed. Dramatically. There is no point in nostalgia for a world irredeemably
lost. By that metric the times of our lives are bleak for contemporary theorists
of rationality, even as some of its defenders, such as du Gay (2000), fight a
rearguard action against the demise of liberalism. In post-liberal worlds,
according to Ritzer (2004c) we encounter meaningless work; March (2002)
similarly regards most of us as trapped in exploitative organizations. Ritzer
sees our existence in the McDonaldized world of work mirrored in consuming
passions that nothing can sate, in markets in which all must compete (Ritzer
2004a). On this latter account, nothingness pervades the far horizon of most
of our times and only the haute bourgeois — who can afford taste — seem
able to escape it (Bourdieu 1984), a position which, as critics such as Lewis
(1975: 77–78) allege, would remain faithful to Weber in its values.
What is perhaps most worrying about a world of nothing, in which things
are voraciously sought as props for identity, is that nothingness becomes an
escalator for consumption. Identity positions one in terms of the social
economy of positional goods (Hirsch 1976) and their distribution, rather 
than the material economy of things. In the material economy Adam Smith’s
competitive forces may indeed produce more for everyone. With increased
demand, wider markets, greater international divisions of labour and
economies of scale, the unit cost of goods will be lowered. But the positional
economy is characterized by goods that Hirsch describes as ‘social’, whose
sociability becomes the very source of Ritzer’s nothingness. Our enjoyment
of a thing is affected by whether or not other people are consuming it as well.
The key aspect of positional goods is that if everyone who wants them, have
them, they no longer enjoy the same value. Luxury goods such as Armani
suits, Cartier watches, or Manolo Blahnik shoes obviously fall into this
category, but perhaps more interesting are commodities that more obviously
meet the criteria of nothing as Ritzer defines it. Perhaps the best example
would be a mobile phone, if only because the success of the ‘democratically’
voted ‘reality’ shows, such as Idol or Survivor, depends on mass participation
by consumers using the SMS function of their phone. Their unique vote (or
votes if they follow the adage of ‘vote early, vote often’) not only states a
preference but makes a profit. The finale of the 2004 Australian Idol show
earned one of its sponsors, Telstra, the telecom carrier, $25m.2
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Mobile phones are a perfect example of an unsustainable and positional
nothing. A mobile phone that is five years old will do much the same basic
things as a current model but the additional features of the current model 
are what style-conscious consumers crave; the video-phone, camera, and
polyphonic tunes. It is the additional features, heavily promoted, that sell the
newest version and diminish the appeal of earlier, fully functioning, models.
It is not so much a case of planned obsolescence, as Vance Packard (1962)
observed in the 1950s, as stylistic, aesthetic and material discontinuity: the
dematerialization of nothing. But, when dematerialized, the batteries that
power this type of nothing end up in a landfill.
Contemporary affluence in the material economy now means that more
people can compete in the positional economy. The cycle of status ascription
has sped up enormously; today, people who, a generation before, would 
have been peasants or proletarians, can dress in the finest designer clothes
that money can buy but, of course, as soon as such items become widely
distributed — or copied — they no are no longer something so much as being
on a rapid descent to becoming nothing. The globalization of nothing —
especially of global media positioning what’s hot and what’s not, which, 
of necessity, is driven by commercial dictates that speed up the cycle of
fashionability — ensures that more and more means less and less. It also
means that more and more is consumed as the life cycle of things diminishes
due to the requirements of fashion rather than the functionality of use. We
consume more material goods and use more material resources simply to
preserve our relative position on an escalator of consumption that only knows
how to speed up. Hirsch argued that the rise of positional goods would limit
growth, since by definition they had to be scarce. Yet people have proved
ingenious at creating ever more sources of exclusivity. That is how the
simultaneous movement of nothing being globalized and something being
distinguished occurs. For as long as elites can maintain some things as
positional goods, they may mean something. But the time in which they mean
this diminishes exponentially; hence nothing always threatens something.
While there is neither need for nostalgia nor existential exhaustion at the
nothingness of consumption that stretches before us at every turn, there is
every point in recalling Weber as an exemplar, pioneering organization
analysis as a facet of a broader cultural studies, not only concerned with issues
of sustainability but also as one who provides a compass capable of steering
insight into the new cultural meanings that frame our lives, not only the game
players who compete to survive but also those who do not play the game.
Many increasingly drop out, making more space for themselves and their
families, embracing new non-materialist values, such as those of the ‘green’
movement, and trying to apply these in their working lives: the growth of 
the concern with ‘sustainability’, for instance (see Dunphy et al. 2000). The
concern with sustainability was already uppermost in Weber’s mind over 100
years ago. For instance, at the end of his study of The Protestant ethic and
the spirit of capitalism (1976), he noted that, while it would be instrumentally
rational to consume resources till the last ton of fossil fuel was exhausted;
only a fool bent on environmental folly would undertake such industry. 
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In substantive or real terms this kind of rationality was idiocy. It was, of
course, also rife, especially as many of the decisions that contributed to it
were made by experts in bureaucracies run on rational principles of efficiency
in which ‘externalities’ did not count because neither the expertise embedded
in the private bureaucracy of the firm nor the public bureaucracy of the state
made them do so.
That the solution proffered in contemporary times to problems neglected
in the past is a new set of cultural values forming around nature would not,
one thinks, have been a surprise to Weber. While the social project that might
carry these values was hardly legitimated in his day, and was, at best, seen
as part of an eccentric Arts and Crafts movement, associated with people such
as William Morris (1967), it nonetheless found echoes in Weber, who saw
the significance of ‘the last ton of fossilized coal’. Perhaps, when he suggested
that escape from the iron cage demanded the advent of new ‘prophets’ and a
rebirth of ‘old ideals’, there was already an intimation of what responsible
scholars and intellectuals should have been thinking about these past 100
years. Hirsch (1976) took these issues seriously but scholars who contribute
to organization studies do not discuss his work frequently. (For exceptions,
largely from cognate areas rather than the core organization studies field, see
Zukin and DiMaggio 1990; Pierson 2000; Campbell 1998; Birch 2003.)
Conclusion
Wherever the market economy has triumphed we can relate to a form of life
spawned by excessive individualism, guided by illusionary visions, mediated
by democratic rituals, inculcated in a culture of narcissism, expressed though
metaphors of sport, engaged in a struggle for survival. According to the
present analysis, it is the life our most pervasive popular culture tells us we
live, and Weber’s example, pointing us to the intersection of organization and
cultural studies, remains as relevant for this turn of the century as it did for
the last. The fusion of engagement and contemporary culture, and the analysis
of lifestyle guides as small texts of everyday life, whether those of Benjamin
Franklin or Trinny and Susannah, should be a central project today as it was
in Weber’s times. And just as the analysis of Franklin’s small texts told us a
great deal about the geist of those times, so more contemporary lifestyle texts,
from SMS to reality TV, can inform us about the spirit of the present age, in
which, it is suggested, working, surviving and profiting by constructing and
organizing an appropriate identity is a ‘life project’, in every sense of those
words.
Many thanks to Julie Gustavs, Ray Gordon, Tyrone Pitsis, Carl Rhodes, Martin Kornberger
and Chris Carter, as well as the Organization Studies reviewers, for comments on earlier drafts.
1 Title owed to Neil Young (1979).
2 Sydney Morning Herald, 22 November 2004, p.1.
Clegg: Puritans, Visionaries and Survivors 541
Notes
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on May 25, 2011oss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Albrow, Martin
1970 Bureaucracy. London: Pall Mall.
Birch, David
2003 ‘Corporate social responsibility:
Some key theoretical issues and
concepts for new ways of doing
business’. Journal of New Business
Ideas and Trends 1/1: 1–19.
Bourdieu, Pierre
1984 Distinction: A social critique of the
judgement of taste. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Cage, John
1961 Silence. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan
University Press.
Cálas, Marta, and Linda Smircich
1999 ‘Post modernism? Reflections and
tentative directions’. Academy of
Management Review 24/4:
649–671.
Callon, Michel
1998 The laws of the markets. Oxford:
Blackwell/The Sociological
Review.
Callon, Michel
1999 ‘Actor network theory: The market
test’ in Actor network theory and
after. J. Law and J. Hassard (eds),
181–195. Oxford: Blackwell.
Campbell, John L.
1998 ‘Institutional analysis and the role
of ideas in political economy’.
Theory and Society 27/3: 377–409.
Clegg, Stewart R.
1995a ‘Of values and occasional irony:
Max Weber in the context of the
sociology of organizations’ in
Research in the sociology of
organizations: Studies of
organizations in the European
tradition, S. B. Bachrach, P.
Gagliardi, and B. Mundel (eds),
1–46. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Clegg, Stewart R.
1995b ‘Weber and Foucault: Social theory
for the study of organizations’,
Organization 1/1: 149–178.
Clegg, Stewart R., Paul Boreham, and
Geoff Dow
1986 Class, politics and the economy.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Cohen, Stanley, and Laurie Taylor
1976 Escape attempts: The theory and
practice of resistance to everyday
life. London: Allen Lane.
du Gay, Paul
2000 In praise of bureaucracy. London:
Sage.
Dunphy, Dexter, Andrew Griffiths, 
J. Beneviste, and P. Sutton
2000 Sustainability: Corporate challenge
for the 21st century. Sydney: Allen
& Unwin.
During, Simon, editor
1993 ‘Introduction’ in The cultural
studies reader, 1–32. London:
Routledge.
Dyck, Bruno
1997 ‘Understanding configuration and
transformation through a multiple
rationalities approach’. Journal of
Management Studies 34/5:
793–823.
Foucault, Michel
1997 ‘The birth of biopolitics’ in Michel
Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and
truth. Paul Rabinow (ed.), 73–79.
New York: New York Press.
Fox, Alan
1974 Beyond contract: Work, power and
trust relations. London: Faber &
Faber.
Gambetta, Diego, editor
1988 Trust: Making and breaking 
co-operative relations. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Gamble, Andrew
1988 The free economy and the strong
state: The politics of Thatcherism.
London: Macmillan.
Gilliam, Terry, and Terry Jones
1975 Monty Python and the Holy Grail.
Columbia/Tristar Studios.
Goffman, Erving
1959 The presentation of self in everyday
life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
542 Organization Studies 26(4)
References
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on May 25, 2011oss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Granovetter, Mark
2002 ‘Economic action and social
structure: The problem of
embeddedness’ in Central currents
in organization studies I:
Frameworks and applications.
S. R. Clegg (ed.), Volume 3:
363–389. London: Sage; originally
published in the American Journal
of Sociology 93/3: 481–510.
Hirsch, Fred
1976 The social limits to growth. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Joyce, James
1977 A portrait of the artist as a young
man. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Kafka, Franz
1956 The trial. London: Secker &
Warburg.
Kalberg, Stephen
1980 ‘Max Weber’s types of rationality:
Cornerstones for the analysis of
rationalization processes in history’.
American Journal of Sociology
85/5: 1145–1179.
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss
1990 When giants learn to dance.
London: Unwin Hyman.
Kramer, Rodney M.
2003 ‘The virtues of prudent trust’ in
Debating organizations: Point-
counterpoint in organization
studies. R. Westwood, R. and 
S. R. Clegg (eds), 341–355. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Lewis, John
1975 Max Weber and value free
sociology: A Marxist critique.
London: Lawrence & Wishart.
March, James G.
2002 ‘The future, disposable
organizations and the rigidities of
imagination’ in Central currents in
organization studies II:
Contemporary trends. S. R. Clegg
(ed.), Volume 8: 266–277. London:
Sage; originally published in
Organization, 1995, 2/3,4: 427–440.
Mills, C. Wright
2002 ‘Situated actions and vocabularies
of motive’ in Central currents in
organization studies II:
Contemporary trends, S. R. Clegg
(ed.), Volume 6: 183–192. London:
Sage; originally published in
American Sociological Review 5:
904–913.
Mol, Alan
1999 ‘Ontological politics: A word and
some questions’ in Actor network
theory and after. J. Law and 
J. Hassard (eds), 74–89. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Monk, Thelonius
1955 Pure Monk. Milestone 47004.
Morris, William
1967 The work of William Morris,
selected and edited by Paul
Thompson, London: Heinemann.
Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler
1992 Reinventing government: 
How the entrepreneurial spirit is
transforming the public sector.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Packard, Vance
1962 The hidden persuaders.
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Peters, Tom
1992 Liberation management: Necessary
disorganization for the nanosecond
nineties. London: Macmillan.
Pierson, Paul
2000 ‘The limits of design: Explaining
institutional origins and change’.
Governance 13/4: 475–499.
Pugh, Derek S., editor
1971 Organization theory: Selected
readings. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Ritzer, George
2004a The globalization of nothing.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge
Press.
Ritzer, George
2004b Enchanting a disenchanted world:
Revolutionizing the means of
consumption, 2nd edn. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
Clegg: Puritans, Visionaries and Survivors 543
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on May 25, 2011oss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Ritzer, George
2004c The McDonaldization of society.
Newbury Park, CA: Pine Forge
Press.
Robbins, Stephen P., and 
David A. De Cenzo
2005 Fundamentals of management, 5th
edn, New York: Prentice Hall.
Roper, Lyndal
1994 Oedipus and the devil: Witchcraft,
sexuality, and religion in early
modern Europe. London:
Routledge.
Schreurs, Petra
2000 Enchanting rationality: An analysis
of rationality in the Anglo-American
discourse on public organization.
Delft: Uitgereverji Eburon.
Schutz, Alfred
1976 ‘Fragments on the phenomenology
of music’ in In search of musical
method. F. J. Smith (ed.), 23–71.
London: Gordon & Breach.
Shenhav, Yehouda
1999 Manufacturing rationality: 
The engineering foundations of the
managerial revolution. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Sievers, Burkhardt
2003 ‘“Fool’d with hope, men favour the
deceit”, or, can we trust in trust?’ in
Debating organizations: Point-
counterpoint in organization
studies. R. Westwood and 
S. R. Clegg (eds), 356–367. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Spencer, Herbert
1904 First principles. London: Williams
& Norgate.
Therborn, Göran
1976 Science, class, and society: On the
formation of sociology and
historical materialism. London:
NLB.
Trinca, Helen, and Catherine Fox
2004 Better than sex: How a whole
generation got hooked on work.
Milsons Point, NSW: Random
House.
Weber, Max
1930 The Protestant ethic and the spirit
of capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons.
London: Allen & Unwin.
Weber, Max
1946 From Max Weber: Essays in
sociology, translated, edited, and
with an introduction, by H. H. Gerth
and C. Wright Mills. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Weber, Max
1947 Max Weber: The theory of social
and economic organization, edited
with an introduction by Talcott
Parsons, translated by 
A. M. Henderson and Talcott
Parsons. New York: Free Press.
Weber, Max
1949 The methodology of the social
sciences, translated and edited by
Edward A. Shils and Henry A.
Finch; with a foreword by Edward
A. Shils. New York: Free Press.
Weber, Max
1954 Max Weber on law in economy and
society, translated, edited, and with
an introduction, by H. H. Gerth and
C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Weber, Max
1962 Basic concepts in sociology,
translated and with an introduction
by H. P. Secher. Secaucus, NJ:
Citadel Press.
Weber, Max
1965 The sociology of religion, translated
by Ephraim Fischoff with an
introduction by Talcott Parsons.
London: Methuen.
Weber, Max
1970 Max Weber: The interpretation of
social reality, edited and with an
introductory essay by 
J. E. T. Eldridge. London: Michael
Joseph.
Weber, Max
1973 Max Weber on universities: The
power of the state and the dignity of
the academic calling in Imperial
Germany, translated, edited, and
with an introductory note by
Edward Shils. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
544 Organization Studies 26(4)
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on May 25, 2011oss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Weber, Max
1976 The Protestant ethic and the spirit
of capitalism, with an introduction
by Anthony Giddens. London:
Allen & Unwin.
Weber, Max
1978 Economy and society: An outline of
interpretative sociology. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.
Young, Neil, and Crazy Horse
1979 Rust Never Sleeps. Los Angeles:
Reprise.
Zukin, S., and P. DiMaggio
1990 Structures of capital: The social
organization of the economy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Clegg: Puritans, Visionaries and Survivors 545
Stewart Clegg is professor of management at the University of Technology, Sydney,
and the Director of ICAN Research (www.ican.uts.edu.au), as well as being a visiting
professor at the University of Aston, UK, visiting professor of organizational change
management, Maastricht University Faculty of Business, and visiting professor and
international fellow in discourse and management theory, Centre of Comparative
Social Studies, Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. He has published
in journals such as the Administrative Science Quarterly, Organization Studies,
Organization, British Journal of Management and Human Relations. His most recent
book is Managing and organizations: An introduction to theory and practice
(London: Sage, 2005, with Martin Kornberger and Tyrone Pitsis). He is currently
working on the second edition of the Handbook of organization studies, produced
with Cynthia Hardy and Walter Nord (London: Sage, 1996), which won the American
Academy of Management George R. Terry ‘Best Book’ Award for ‘Outstanding
Contributions to Management Knowledge’ in 1997. He has been an elected Fellow
of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia since 1988, and a Distinguished
Fellow of the Australian and New Zealand Academy of Management since 1998.
Address: School of Management, University of Technology, Sydney, PO Box 123,
Broadway NSW 2007, Sydney, Australia.
E-mail: s.clegg@uts.edu.au
Stewart Clegg
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on May 25, 2011oss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
